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Abstract 
Presented is an evolutionary model of consumer non-durable markets, which is an extension 
of a previously published paper on consumer durables. The model suggests that the 
repurchase process is governed by preferential growth. Applying statistical methods it can be 
shown that in a competitive market the mean price declines according to an exponential law 
towards a natural price, while the corresponding price distribution is approximately given by a 
Laplace distribution for independent price decisions of the manufacturers. The sales of 
individual brands are determined by a replicator dynamics. As a consequence the size 
distribution of business units is a lognormal distribution, while the growth rates are also given 
by a Laplace distribution. Moreover products with a higher fitness replace those with a lower 
fitness according to a logistic law.  
Most remarkable is the prediction that the price distribution becomes unstable at market 
clearing, which is in striking difference to the Walrasian picture in standard microeconomics. 
The reason for this statement is that competition between products exists only if there is an 
excess supply, causing a decreasing mean price. When, for example by significant events, 
demand increases or is equal to supply, competition breaks down and the price exhibits a 
jump. When this supply shortage is accompanied with an arbitrage for traders, it may even 
evolve into a speculative bubble. Neglecting the impact of speculation here, the evolutionary 
model can be linked to a stochastic jump-diffusion model.           
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1. Introduction 
The evolutionary model of non-durable markets presented here is an extension of a 
previously published approach to consumer durable goods [1-3]. The key idea is that similar 
to durable goods, also non-durables must be governed by the evolutionary Variation-
Selection-Reproduction (VSR) mechanism [4, 5]. The VSR-mechanism can be understood as 
follows:  
 In an anonymous, competitive, non-durable market manufacturers offer the same good 
with slightly different product features. We want to denote the product variants as brands. We 
consider firms as consisting of a number of business units producing the corresponding brand. 
The features are related on the one hand to utility properties of a brand and on the other hand 
to its product price. There are non-durable goods which are per definition standards (e.g. 
electric current). In this case the brands differ only in the price.  
 A business unit can be treated as an input-output system, where the input is the 
financial revenue and the output is its product supply.  Together with the demand side of the 
market the business units form a reproduction cycle (R).  During the reproduction process, 
however business units vary the features of the brands a bit, in particular the price (V). The 
preferences of potential consumers determine the selective "environment" for the brands (S). 
Those brands which correspond closest to consumer demand will be preferentially selected. 
As a result the reproduction cycle is self-amplifying and characterized by a preferential 
growth. Specifying the growth rate as the fitness of a brand we will derive below that the unit 
sales are governed by a replicator dynamics. In evolutionary terms the fittest brands have an 
evolutionary (competitive) advantage compared to other products. Since brands with a lower 
fitness have to increase their fitness or disappear from the market, the overall fitness of the 
good will increase over a long period of time. In other words, the model suggests that Adam 
Smith "invisible hand" is the evolutionary VSR-mechanism. 
 Applying statistical methods a model is developed that describes qualitatively the 
evolution of a non-durable consumer market over a long time period. This model is valid if 
the product fitness, which is a function of the price, has a single maximum. This maximum is 
determined by the willingness to pay a minimum price, denoted as the natural price. However, 
in difference to durables, non-durables are often the subject of speculation. In this case the 
condition may not be fulfilled, because speculators are interested in an increasing price 
instead to pay the natural price. They can disturb the market considerably. In order to keep the 
model simple, the impact of speculators on the market evolution is neglected here.   
  Within this limitation the time evolution of the sales of the individual brands can be 
derived from a consideration of demand and supply flows. Also derived is the size and growth 
rate distribution of the business units (products), and the price distribution and mean price 
evolution of the brands. Based on empirical investigations, the price evolution for non-
durables is usually modelled by stochastic differential equations. In this paper it is shown that 
the evolutionary model can be mapped qualitatively to a standard jump-diffusion spot price 
model.  
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2.  The Model 
 
2.1. The Non-Durable Market 
 
 We start with a consideration of the (static) non-durable market. 
 
The supply side 
 
 The supply side is determined by a number of different variants of the non-durable, 
denoted as brands, having similar utility properties. They are produced and distributed by 
manufacturers, while each brand is assigned to a business unit.  We want to indicate the 
brands (and the corresponding business units) with index i, while N>1 is its total number. 
(We exclude here a monopoly market). The absolute number of units of the i-th brand sold per 
unit time is denoted Yi, while Si indicates the number of supplied units.  
 The real price μi of the i-th brand is the nominal price scaled by the mean income. The 
mean price is determined by: 
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while the brackets indicate the average over the sold units, while total unit sales and total 
supply flow can be obtained from: 
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The demand side 
 
 The demand side can be characterized by an ensemble of agents who are interested in 
purchasing the non-durable. As for all physical goods the purchase process can be separated 
into first purchase and repurchase of the good, while repurchase separates into replacement 
and multiple purchase. In order to understand the first purchase process we have to emphasize 
that some non-durables are coupled to a complementary durable good (called system 
coupling). So for example energy is necessary for the application of engines in durable goods 
(e.g. cars) and therefore first purchase of the corresponding nondurable (e.g. fuel) depends on 
the diffusion of the durable good. We want to denote the number of agents, who have adopted 
the durable good as N(t) and the total number of interested agents as the market potential M. 
For inexpensive non-durables products, which have no system coupling (e.g. food) the 
adoption process (N(t)) is limited by the information spreading process, which can be well 
described by Bass diffusion [1,6,7]. However, the mean lifetime of the non-durable good is 
short (usually in the order of less than a couple of weeks). Therefore correlations in the unit 
sales caused by the replacement of the good will, in difference to durable goods, disappear 
fast. Therefore repurchase can be treated as an effective multiple purchase.  Because the first 
purchase process evolves much slower than the repurchase process, we assume: 
 
i) The repurchase of a non-durable follows the adoption process immediately.    
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In this case we can define a total demand rate as: 
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where q(<μ>)>0 is a price dependent multiple purchase rate. It determines the mean number 
of purchase decisions per adopter per unit time. The demand rate is proportional to the 
number of adopters, N(t). Note that the demand of the non-durable is determined by the mean 
amount, per purchase decision m. Usually non-durables can be purchase in single units, then 
m=1 unit. But if this is not the case (e.g. fuel) the value of m has to be modified by a 
corresponding average (e.g. mean tank content).  
 In order to establish a theory with continuous variables, we scale extensive variables 
by the market potential M, which is a large figure. The corresponding density becomes:  
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where n(t)=N(t)/M . The corresponding purchase and supply flow densities are determined 
by: 
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The key idea to describe the demand rate is the following assumption: 
 
ii) It exists a minimum mean price μm>0, at which the demand rate has a maximum.    
 
Following Adam Smith we want to denote this minimum price as the natural price. This 
assumption reflects the "law" of diminishing marginal utility of a non-durable (Gossen's law). 
In other words, the willingness to pay has a maximum at μm and hence the demand rate in 
Eq.(4) has a maximum. Sufficiently close to μm the total demand rate can be expanded as a 
function of the mean price as:  
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where dm is a maximum demand. For some non-durables dm exhibits periodic variations (e.g. 
electricity). Note that as mentioned above the impact of speculation is neglected.  
 
2.2. The Market Dynamics 
 
The market dynamics is determined by both, the supply and demand side.  
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The supply side 
 
The key process on the supply side is the production and distribution of the good by 
the business units (firms). As discussed above we can consider the business units as input-
output systems, where the financial flow (revenue) is the input and the output is the product 
supply. The supply flow can therefore be viewed as a function of the unit sales si=si(yi). 
Expanding the supply of the i-th brand up to the first order we obtain: 
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where δt is a short time increment indicating the response time on an input variation. In order 
to keep the model simple this time shift is neglected,  δt=0.  
 Without input flow (proportional to the unit sales yi) the output flow si will be zero, 
hence c1=0. Further we write c2=1+γi(t), where the productivity γ(t) is denoted as 
reproduction coefficient. We obtain for the supply flow: 
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This relation determines that the supply side completely. It suggests that the supply of a brand 
follows the evolution of the unit sales. Differences between unit sales and supply flow are 
contained in the reproduction coefficient. The total supply obeys the relation:  
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while <γ> is the mean reproduction coefficient. 
 
 
The demand side 
  
  The key idea to determine the demand side is to consider the repurchase process as 
consisting of statistical events, where potential consumers meet available units of the i-th 
brand (e.g. in stores, the internet etc.) and purchase it with a certain probability. In order to 
establish a relation for the unit sales of the i-th brand, we introducing the density of potential 
consumers, as the number of potential consumers scaled by the market potential. Further the 
density of available unit's xi, is the total number of units available in stores scaled by the 
market potential. The unit sales yi must be zero if there are either no potential consumers or 
available units. Expanding the unit sales of the i-th brand up to the first order, yi must be 
proportional to the product of both densities. Hence purchase events occur with a frequency:   
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where the probability rate ηi>0 specifies the mean success of the i-th model and is denoted as 
the preference parameter. This parameter characterizes the product features and the spatial 
distribution of a brand. The product price μi for which the brand is available limits the density 
of potential consumers (μi). Note that Eq.(10) expresses Say's theorem, which suggests that 
supply creates its own demand.  
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 The densities of potential consumers and available units can be obtained from balance 
relations (conservation laws). The density of available products of a brand, is determined by 
the balance between supply and purchase flow: 
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where we used Eq.(8). That means the density of available unit's increase, when there is a 
higher supply flow than purchase flow proportional to the reproduction parameter.    
 The density of potential consumers is governed on the other hand by the generation of 
new potential adopters given by the demand rate, and their disappearance due to the purchase 
of the good:  
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The stationary density of potential consumers ψS is determined by the condition dψ/dt=0. In 
this state the demand rate is just equal to the sales:  
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 Remarkable is that, despite from small fluctuations, this relation always holds, as long 
as the demand rate is just a function of the mean price. This can be seen by testing the 
stability of the stationary density ψS. Perturbing this state by a small quantity ψ(), such that 
ψ()=ψS+ ψ() and inserting this relation into Eq.(12) we get with Eq.(10):  
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Writing a time dependent fluctuation as:  
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we obtain that  is negative, because ixi>0. Therefore, small fluctuations always disappear 
and ψS is a stable state for a given mean price. For the stationary state the density of potential 
adopters becomes:  
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 Obviously Eq.(13) suggests that the total unit sales can be obtained from the total 
demand using Eq. (6), for a given mean price. Therefore we have to focus on the mean price 
evolution. The key idea to specify the mean price evolution is the assumption: 
 
iii) In a competitive market the mean price varies much slower than the price of the individual 
brands.  
 
This assumption is called in standard microeconomics price rigidity [8]. It allows us to 
introduce a sufficiently short time scale η on which the mean price can be considered to be 
constant. The short is related to the long time scale according to:  
 
t
 (17) 
 
with ε<<1. (For example if t is in years and η in weeks, ε≈1/50). On this time scale the mean 
price is a constant: 
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  However, if the mean price is a constant on the short time scale, Eq.(13) suggests that 
also the total demand and the corresponding total sales must be a constant: 
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This result implies that all brands together cannot sell more than yt, which leads to a 
considerable competition between the brands. The individual unit sales can be obtained on the 
short time scale from a time derivative of Eq.(10):  
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while we have used that the total market is in a stationary state. We can consider price and 
preference (utility) variations as constant interrupted by small jumps on the short time scale. 
The first two summands can therefore be treated to contribute additive fluctuations δ(η,μ). 
Taking advantage of Eq.(11), we obtain for the third term: 
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This relation suggests that price and preference jumps induce multiplicative fluctuations of 
the unit sales. The multiplicative fluctuations will have a higher impact on the sales evolution 
than additive fluctuations.  
 Neglecting the latter and introducing the rate: 
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Eq.(21) turns into 
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The constraint Eq.(19), can be satisfied by adding a constant growth rate ζ such that:     
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Inserting this relation into Eq.(19) we obtain: 
 
t
i
i
i
y
fy
f


 
(25) 
 
Rewriting Eq.(24), the sales evolution of the i-th brand is determined by the replicator 
equation: 
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where we have introduced the growth rate of the i-th brand in terms of unit sales, ri. Because 
from evolutionary models the parameter fi in the replicator equation is known as the fitness, 
we want to denote fi here as the product fitness. 
 This is a remarkable result, because it suggests that the brands stand in an evolutionary 
competition. The sales of those brands with a higher product fitness than the mean fitness 
increase. The fitness space is determined by the preference parameter η, the demand rate as a 
function of the product price μ and the reproduction coefficient γ. The fitness has therefore 
contributions from both sides of the market. (Note that strictly speaking  
 Due to random price jumps, the fitness fluctuates and the unit sales of a business unit 
are governed by a stochastic multiplicative process. The size distribution of the business units 
Py, which is determined by the probability to find the unit sales of a business unit yi in the 
interval y and y+dy, can be derived for the case that fi can be treated as an independent, 
identical distributed, random variable. The central limit theorem suggests that the size 
distribution of the business units is given for a sufficiently long time by a lognormal 
probability distribution function (pdf) of the form: 
 
 
9 
 9 
 







 

t
utyy
yt
tyPy 2
2
0
2
)/ln(
exp
2
1
),(
  
 
(27) 
 
where u and ω are free parameters and y/y0 is the size of the business unit scaled by the size at 
t=0. 
 In our further considerations we want to consider the brands as localized in the fitness 
space. We write the fitness parameters as the sum of a mean value indicated by the brackets 
and small variations:  
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and  
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(30) 
 
 
The mean price evolution 
 
 For the consideration of the price evolution of a non-durable, we want to treat the 
impact of variations of the reproduction parameter and the preference as small and neglect the 
fluctuations Δγ and Δη. Further we introduce the price distribution Pμ, which is determined by 
the relative abundance that a product is purchased in the price interval μ and μ+dμ. The price 
distribution has its mean at: 
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and a variance:  
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With Eq.(28) the fitness of the i-th brand can be expanded as: 
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 The price evolution of the brands can be separated into the evolution of the mean price 
and its price deviations:  
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Because the mean price varies slowly the price distribution undergoes a fast relation to its 
stationary state. 
 The long term evolution of the mean price is determined by the evolution of the mean 
fitness. Using Eq.(31) we obtain f(<μ>)=<f>. Taking the time derivative, the mean fitness 
evolves as: 
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Because the mean fitness is determined by the demand rate Eq.(16) : 
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the mean fitness has its stationary state (d<f>dt=0) when the mean price is equal to the 
natural price. Derived in Appendix A is the evolution of the mean price. The mutual 
competition between the brands causes a mean price evolution of the form: 
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where μ0 is the price at an initial time t=0, and the parameter: 
 
 
)(0  PVara 
 
(36) 
 
is denoted as a price decline rate. Note that the decline rate is zero for a monopoly market, 
because Var(Pμ)=0. The price decline is therefore a direct consequence of the competition 
between the brands, while the variance is treated here as a constant. 
 The price distribution Pμ can be determined from the following assumption:  
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iv) When product sales increase considerably, the business units respond by increasing the 
price and vice versa.  
 
This assumption takes into account the fact that the manufacturers have finite production 
capacities on the short time scale. On the one hand they want to use their capacities,  but on 
the other hand they have an upper capacity limit. The business units, however, respond only 
on the direction of sales variations.  That means,  variations of the price are proportional to the 
sign of a sales variation of the i-th brand. This can be formulated as follows:  
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because the mean price is a constant on this time scale. This relation still holds, if we scale 
within the sign-function by the positive variable yi. Because the sales are governed by the 
replicator equation and we can write: 
  
 ffsign
d
dy
y
sign
d
d
i
i
i
i 





)(~
1
~ 


 
(38) 
 
The present theory therefore suggests that price variations are caused by fitness fluctuations of 
the products around the mean fitness. Taking advantage from the expansion Eq.(31) the 
relation can be rewritten as: 
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 We have to emphasize that the parameters <μ> and <η> are always positive for 
brands with non-zero unit sales. The mean reproduction parameter, however, is governed by 
Eq.(9):  
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where we used Eq.(13). The reproduction parameter is not strictly positive. If total supply 
flow is less than the total demand rate, the mean reproduction parameter becomes negative.  
 Therefore we have to distinguish between two cases: 
 
A) The stable regime: <γ> >0. 
 
In this case is a>0 and the mean price declines with time. Further is:  
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Therefore Eq. (40) suggests that price differences disappear. This can be interpreted as if there 
is a restoring force F(Δμ) that drives the price of the individual brands back to the mean price 
with: 
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The restoring force has its origin the excess supply and the resulting competition between the 
brands. Writing the restoring force as consisting of a deterministic part given by Eq.(42) and a 
stochastic contribution δμ, Eq.(39) turns into a stochastic Langevin equation: 
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For the simplifying assumption that the random price variations are uncorrelated, the 
fluctuations can be treated as white noise with mean value und time correlation:  
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where the brackets with index η indicate the time average and D is a noise amplitude. Based 
on the corresponding Fokker-Planck equation, the stationary price distribution can be 
obtained (Appendix B): 
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where b=<>η/η is a time average over the response of the business units on sales 
variations. The price distribution in the case of a competitive market is therefore 
approximately given by a Laplace (double exponential) distribution. In a semi-log plot, the 
Laplace distribution has a tent shape around the mean price, <μ(t)>.   
  
  
B) The unstable regime: <γ> ≤0. 
 
In this case is a<0 and the mean price increases. Because:  
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there is no restoring force for the price distribution and the price distribution becomes 
unstable, because all manufacturers experience capacity limitation. In difference to standard 
microeconomics the theory therefore suggests that at market clearing the price becomes 
unstable. It goes beyond the abilities of the model to describe the unstable regime exactly. 
Though, we can expect that the condition of a slowly varying mean price is not fulfilled (on 
the chosen short time scale). In the unstable regime and the mean price will therefore exhibit a 
rapid increase. 
 The model therefore suggests that the time evolution of the mean price of a non-
durable market separates into two regimes, a stable and an unstable regime. This result of the 
model is displayed in Fig.1 for a storable non-durable good. Shown is the demand rate d(μ) 
and supply curve s(μ). Eq.(40) suggests that the stable regime is characterized by an excess 
supply <γ>>0. Here total supply st increases total demand (unit sales) yt and the excess supply 
xt is stored and available for consumers to purchase. The excess supply induces competition 
between the brands and the price fluctuates around the mean price  according to a Laplace 
distribution. As a consequence of this competition the price declines on the long time scale 
according to an exponential law approaching the minimum price μm (Eq.(35)).  
 The price can increase for non-durables either slowly or rapidly. A shallow price 
increase occurs if the total demand increases faster in time than total supply. This can be the 
case when the number of adopters N(t) increases in time, which is usually a slow process. A 
rapid increase of the price, however, has its origin in a supply shortage cause for example by a 
rare event (e.g. weather events, catastrophes etc.). In this case total demand increases or is 
equal to total supply, <γ>≤0,  and manufacturers can get rid all of their products (Fig.1). 
Because there is no competition the price distribution is unstable in this regime, and causes a 
rapid price increase. Theoretically, these price jumps should be small because a fluctuation is 
usually close to <γ>=0, and ends in the stable regime where <γ>>0.   
 However, a rapid price increase may change the purchase behaviour of the consumers 
for non-durables. In expecting a further rising price, they start to store the non-durable, which 
can be interpreted as an increased preference. As a result the demand curve shifts effectively 
such that the distance to <γ>=0 increases, and the market remains even longer in the unstable 
regime. This is a case of self-fulfilling prophecy.  In addition the price increase offers traders 
an extra arbitrage. Therefore speculators start to purchase additional amounts of the non-
durable. When this happens, the supply shortage turns into a speculative bubble and the jump 
size of the price increase can hardly be predicted.  
 Arrived in the stable regime the price starts in the long term to decrease, due to mutual 
competition between the brands. If the impact of speculations is small, the mean price 
decreases on average according to an exponential law. However, if a considerable amount of 
the non-durable is stored for speculative reasons, the traders are forced to sell the good in 
order to make their arbitrage. This behaviour of the traders leads to considerable price jumps. 
Because we have neglected in this model the impact of speculators, displayed in the insert of 
Fig.1 is the price evolution after a supply shortage as can be expected from the evolutionary 
model. After a price increase the price relaxes towards μm. But the mean price cannot come 
deep into the unstable region. The price approaches and repels from μc(t) and has stable 
periods intermitted by unstable phases, if  μc(t)>> μm.  
   
 
Mapping the evolutionary to a stochastic model 
 
 From the study of the empirical time evolution stochastic spot price models where 
established for non-durables, having its origins in the investigation of financial markets [9]. 
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We want to link the evolutionary dynamics derived above to standard stochastic spot price 
dynamics.  
 The simplest model taking into account mean-reverting behavior in a stochastic 
approach is given by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (Vasicek model) [10]. Here the price 
evolution is a diffusion process satisfying the stochastic differential equation: 
 
 dWdd    
(47) 
 
where W is a standard Brownian motion (Wiener process),  ζ the constant volatility of the 
process and λ the velocity with which the price reverts on the short time scale to its long term 
mean price <μ(t)>. This relation corresponds to Eq.(43) in the evolutionary model. However, 
the fluctuations are governed for large price deviations by a fat tailed Laplace distribution, not 
by a normal distribution. Note that fat tails can be also modeled by setting  the volatility ζ  
proportional to μ, which was done for example in the Pilipovic model [11]. 
 Significant but rare events may lead to a supply shortage. In this case the evolutionary 
price distribution becomes unstable causing a rapid increasing price. These price jumps can be 
included in stochastic differential equations by introducing additional jump terms [12]. The 
evolutionary model can therefore be mapped to a jump-diffusion stochastic equation of the 
general form: 
 
      )(,, fdQJdWdd    
(48) 
 
where the arrival of jumps is usually treated as a Poisson process dQ(f) with arrival frequency 
parameter f and jump size J. Several models were developed for the price evolution including 
jump-diffusion models with appropriate functions λ, ζ and J [9,13].  
 While on the short time scale <μ(t)> can be treated as a constant, on the long time 
scale the mean price decreases exponentially towards μm (with eventual seasonal variations), 
approaching the price at market clearing μc(t) (<γ>=0). The exponential decline can be 
interpreted as a mean reverting process equivalent to Eq.(47). However, market clearing 
depends on variations in the intersection of the supply and demand curve. Therefore, μc(t) 
varies on the long time scale and can be treated also as a fluctuating variable (Pilipovic 
model).  
     
The growth rate distribution 
 
 The growth rate distribution Pr(r) determines the relative abundance of a business unit 
to have a growth rate in the interval r and r+dr . Because the growth rate and the price 
variations are related by Δμ=(df/dμ)-1r, the short term growth rate distribution can be obtained 
by changing the variables in Eq.(45). Therefore the growth rate distribution is also determined 
by a Laplace distribution: 
 
 rrPr exp~)(  
(49) 
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A constant fitness advantage 
 
We want to discuss the impact of a constant fitness advantage over a long time period. 
The market can be reduced to the two product case, i=1,2. The first product has fitness f1, 
while all other brands can be summarized to the second product with fitness f2, such that  
f1>>f2. Applying the quotient rule to the replicator equation we obtain:  
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where the fitness advantage is:  
 
21 ff 
 (51)  
 
The differential equation can be solved by a separation of the variables. Taking advantage 
from the assumption that  is a constant, the time evolution of the market shares on the long 
time scale has the form: 
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(52)  
 
while Cm is an integration constant. This result suggests that the relation y1/y2  respectively the 
corresponding market shares must be a linear function plotted in a half- logarithmic diagram. 
We can conclude that a constant fitness advantage , leads to a replacement of the current 
products over a long time period according to a logistic law.  
  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 Presented is an evolutionary model for non-durable markets, which is equivalent to a 
model for durable goods, taking the specifics of non-durables into account. Their key features 
are a short lifetime and usually low costs for a single unit. At introduction a brand faces the 
competition with other brands and must therefore have at least an equivalent or higher fitness 
than the other brands. In the introduction phase the market penetration of a non-durable can 
be expected to be governed by Bass diffusion. However, when a non-durable forms a system 
with a durable good, its penetration evolves parallel to the diffusion of the durable good. This 
paper focuses not on the market penetration, but on the sales and price dynamics of non-
durable goods. The model suggests that similar to durables the dynamics of the individual 
non-durable brands is governed by a replicator equation in a competitive market. 
 Note that for consumer durables, a supply shortage is rather unlikely because due to its 
long lifetime a repurchase of the good can be shifted. This condition is usually not fulfilled for 
non-durables. Owing the short lifetime, non-durables must be permanently repurchased. 
Therefore in difference to durables  a supply shortage may occur and we have to take the 
possibility into account that total demand increases total supply. From the evolutionary point 
of view this is a dramatic event, because when all producers can sell the entire output, 
competition brakes down. The evolutionary model suggests that in this case the price 
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distribution becomes unstable at market clearing, associated with a rapid price increase. 
Therefore the price-demand/supply diagram separates into a stable and an unstable region at 
market clearing (Fig.1). Theoretically the resulting price jumps should be usually small, 
because a slightly increasing mean price leads usually to an excess supply, which re-
establishes competition. (Note that in the electricity market, because the non-durable can 
hardly be stored, day-ahead auctions lead to a market clearing of produced and supplied 
current defining a spot price. However, the competition in this market takes place not with 
delivered current, but with future capacities. A market clearing as meant in this model occurs 
when all available potential capacities equals total future demand. Approaching the clearing 
point, however, the inelastic demand climes up rapidly the increasing supply curve. This leads 
to a spot price jump even before capacity clearing. When capacity clearing occurs, avoiding a 
blackout, a country is forced to import additional capacities.) 
 However, when the consumer behaviour changes upon this event (by an increased 
preference) and moreover traders try to earn an extra arbitrage, the supply shortage may turn 
into a speculative bubble. The chance that durables suffer form speculation is rather low, 
because there is usually an excess supply of durables. But economic history shows that even 
durables can create speculative bubbles. This is particular the case for the real estates [14].  
 As long as the impact of speculation can be neglected the price reverts exponentially 
and approaches the natural price asymptotically. However, if there is a considerable amount 
of the good purchased for speculative reasons, the price may exhibit rapid jumps. This 
behaviour is known for example from the oil price evolution. The present model suggests that 
the dramatic price variations are rather caused by speculators and not by a real demand. There 
are two ways to take speculation into account.  Either speculation is included into the total 
demand curve or as an extra dynamics. Including speculation to demand leads to a multiple 
intersection of the demand and supply curve and to the assumption of a backward bending 
supply curve [15, 16]. However, it can be expected that speculation introduces an extra 
dynamics, because traders have to respond not only on the price, but also on price variations.  
 The presented evolutionary model neglects the impact of a speculative component. 
While for durables this condition is usually fulfilled the model is limited only to those non-
durables satisfying this constrained. In this case the short term price evolution can be mapped 
to a stochastic jump-diffusion model, applied among other models to non-durables [13]. The 
predicted fat tailed price distribution can be found for example in empirical investigations of 
the electricity spot price [17].   
 Finally we want to summarize some key differences of the presented model to 
neoclassic microeconomics, emphasizing the evolutionary economic perspective [18].  
1. The microeconomic approach neglects preference differences between brands of the same 
good, while the evolutionary model takes them explicitly into account. 
2.  Standard microeconomics derives total demand from utility considerations under budget 
constraints. However, utility is not an absolute variable. The utility in terms of product 
features is contained in the evolutionary model in the preference parameter. Total demand is 
related in the present model to the assumption that at natural price, the demand rate must have 
a maximum (Gossen's law). 
3. The evolutionary model treats the purchase process as statistical events (Say's theorem), 
and the dynamics is governed by balance equations. 
4. The dynamics of the supply side is determined by the reproduction cycle. Generally supply 
follows demand, while deviations are contained in a reproduction parameter.   
5. Because the mean price evolves slowly, known in standard microeconomics as price 
rigidities, the total demand rate also evolves slowly. When total supply increases total demand 
the brands suffer from mutual competition. This is the key point of the model! If there is no 
extra supply, competition brakes down.  
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6. In a competitive market the unit sales are governed by a replicator dynamics. The 
individual brands can be characterized by product fitness, depending on the price, preference 
and reproduction parameter. The replicator dynamics leads to an exponential decline of the 
mean price towards the natural price.  
7. Taking into account that the manufacturers want to use their limited capacities, their 
behaviour leads to a Laplace price distribution if their price decisions can be treated as 
uncorrelated. The price fluctuations are initiated by fitness fluctuations of the brand. 
8. Products with a higher fitness replace those with a lower fitness according to a logistic law. 
The good can be considered to evolve over a long period of time trough a series of 
replacements, improving the overall fitness [19, 20]. 
9. The size distribution of the business units (in terms of unit sales) must be lognormal, while 
their growth rate is approximately determined by a Laplace distribution. 
10. Competition brakes down and the market becomes unstable at market clearing (Fig.1). 
This is the most striking difference to the Walrasian picture, which suggests that demand 
equals supply.  
11. When demand is equal or increases supply, caused for example by a significant event, the 
price distribution becomes unstable, i.e. there is no restoring force towards mean price. As a 
result the price exhibits a rapid increase. But only if speculation comes into play, this price 
jump can evolve into a speculative bubble. When the price is close to market clearing it 
undergoes periods of stability intermitted by unstable events. This was suggested by 
Mandelbrot to be a general property for markets [21].  The cobweb model is incorrect. 
12. In standard microeconomics, agents have to maximize their utility respectively their profit 
under constraints. This maximizing process takes place in the evolutionary model by 
maximizing the product fitness. However, in this model economic agents do not have to 
calculate its marginal utility. The optimization takes place on the basis: success breads 
success (VSR mechanism).     
13. Note that the model is not applicable to monopolies. Monopolies are just limited by the 
product demand for a given price [2].  
 Evolutionary processes come into play only statistically. Therefore this theory suffers 
from the problem to establish a direct relation to the individual behaviour of consumers and 
manufacturers. The situation is similar to statistical mechanics, where thermodynamic 
relations are the result of a statistical average and the individual motion has only a probalistic 
meaning. Therefore the evolutionary model is limited to sufficiently large markets, 
respectively market segments.   
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Appendix A 
 
The Mean Price Evolution 
 
 In this chapter we want to consider the evolution of the mean price. We take advantage 
from Eq.(33) and write: 
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using Eq.(6). The time derivative of the mean fitness can be found by using the quotient rule: 
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is the variance of the fitness. Applying the expansion Eq.(31) we further obtain: 
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where we used that <f>=f(<μ>) and<δμ>=0. The price variance is defined as:  
 
 22)(     i
i t
i
y
y
PVar
 
(A6) 
 
Hence we get:  
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(A7) 
 
which is a general result, caused by the competition between brands [1]. With Eq.(A2), the 
price evolution close to μm is governed by:  
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For constant variables the time evolution on the long time scale, is determined by: 
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where μ0 is an integration constant and the parameter 
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is denoted as the price decline rate. This result is equivalent to the case of a competitive 
consumer durable market [1,2].  
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Appendix B 
 
 
The corresponding Fokker-Planck equation of the Langevin equation (43) for the price 
probability distribution can be written as: 
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For a sufficient long time the probability distribution approaches its stationary state 
determined by:  
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with the generalized potential: 
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The integration can be carried out. With Eq.(42) for the restoring force we obtain for the 
stationary price distribution: 
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The price distribution is therefore given by a Laplace (double exponential) 
distribution. The variance of the price distribution is time independent and given by:  
 
2
2
2
1
)(
b
D
PVar   
(B5) 
 
for a constant b=<>η/η , which is a time average over the response of the business units 
on sales variations.
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Figures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Displayed are the demand and supply curves as a function of the real price of a 
storable non-durable, where the stable and unstable regions are indicated by the dotted line at 
market clearing. The insert shows schematically the long term price evolution, which follows 
from a supply shortage event.  
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